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The priority of secured credit has repeatedly and famously been attacked for allowing the 
exploitation of certain types of unsecured creditor. It has also been blamed for creating 
inefficiencies. This paper examines these arguments specifically as applied to this 
jurisdiction, and using both theoretical analysis and recent empirical data, suggests none of 
them can be sustained. It is argued that security is unlikely to lead to the exploitation of 
involuntary, ‘uninformed’, or ‘unsophisticated’ creditors, since the perverse incentives it 
allegedly creates for the debtor’s management are likely to be outweighed by the managers’ 
liquidation-related costs. It is then pointed out that both exploitation-based and inefficiency-
based attack on the priority of secured credit depend on the assumption that secured credit is 
generally cheaper than unsecured credit, and further, that this is why debtors prefer to borrow 
on a secured rather than unsecured basis. Recent evidence from this jurisdiction is used to 
challenge this assumption. This has dramatic implications for the attacks on security, which 
are discussed. The paper concludes with the demonstration that secured credit, by inducing 
creditors to lend when they would not do so without being offered priority, is mutually value-
enhancing for all types of creditor, including unsecured ones. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Three characteristics can be said to distinguish the secured from the unsecured creditor.1 The 
secured creditor obtains priority, the right to have the collateral applied to the satisfaction of 
his debts in a particular order vis-à-vis other creditors. The collateral is also encumbered, in 
that the debtor loses the right to convey to third parties rights inconsistent with those of the 
secured creditor. Finally, security provides a remedy in enforcing the secured debt which is 
quicker and cheaper, hence superior, compared to that afforded to unsecured creditors. It is 
especially when the debtor is on the brink of or actually in insolvency that the existence of 
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 security assumes the greatest significance. From the perspective of English (corporate) 
insolvency law, there is an alternative approach (though a closely linked one) to 
distinguishing secured from unsecured credit. Secured creditors of a debtor subject to that 
part of the law are treated differently from its unsecured creditors in two ways. First, the 
secured creditor stands at the head of the queue for recoupment, from the proceeds of sale of 
the collateral, of what it is owed. It has priority over other creditors. And second, unsecured 
creditors lose their ability independently to pursue their claims, and a special collective 
insolvency regime takes over.2 However, secured claimants have immunity from having to 
participate in this regime, and might for example seize and sell the collateral for the 
satisfaction of their debt.3 Nor is this indulgence towards security holders a relic of the past. 
A recent study found that secured creditors are treated more favourably in this jurisdiction 
than in any of the other fourteen OECD countries studied by the authors.4 
 
 The advantages accorded to the secured creditor have not gone unnoticed. There has 
always been some feeling -- at least among some academic commentators -- that the balance 
is tilted too far in favour of those holding security.5 The Report of the Insolvency Law 
Review Committee proposed certain restrictions on the secured creditors’ ability to enforce 
their security.6 Famously, it suggested that 10% of the value of the assets subject to a floating 
charge be set aside in a company’s insolvency for distribution to unsecured creditors.7 The 
ability of secured creditors to appoint a receiver to manage assets subject to their security 
was also considered, and the Committee proposed a suspension of the security holder’s right 
to enforce that security for twelve months, should a receiver or administrator be appointed.8 
Neither of these proposals was reflected in the Insolvency Act 1985, enacted in response to 
the Cork Report. It is the case, however, that preferential creditors rank ahead of the floating 
charge holder.9 
 
 In the United States, the late 1970s saw the emergence of a debate on the desirability 
of the priority scheme enshrined in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and how it 
should be affected by the onset of the debtor’s bankruptcy. The ranks of those contributing to 
the debate have continued to expand, and the literature is now voluminous.10 Commentators 
in this jurisdiction have taken note, and distinguished company and insolvency law scholars 
have turned their attention to examining the need, role and justifications for secured credit.11 
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 A perusal of most recent scholarship here suggests the pendulum has swung from one 
extreme to the other. In a regime marked by such a tolerant attitude towards the taking of 
security and its enforcement, security in its present form is now freely condemned as unfair 
and inefficient. Various proposals to reign in the almighty secured creditor are receiving 
attention.12 
 
 That a lot of ink has been spilt on arguing about the proper place of security should 
be obvious. Numerous useful summaries of the debate so far and of the state of play at 
present are available.13 Yet another summary would add little of value. So this paper assumes 
some familiarity with the debate, focuses on the position of corporate debtors in this 
jurisdiction, and argues that the academic pendulum has swung too far. Recall the 
insolvency-centred classification of the rights of secured claimants given above. This paper 
addresses itself mainly to issues arising out of the priority of secured claims. It identifies the 
main lines of attack on the institution of secured credit, and attempts a defence based on 
empirical and theoretical (and to a lesser extent, doctrinal) grounds. 
 
Some critics of security have argued that it exists mainly to take value away from 
certain types of unsecured creditor. In particular, debate has centred on the position of 
various sorts of ‘involuntary’ creditors. It has also been argued that some ‘unsophisticated’ 
creditors are unable to price their loans properly, which allows them to be exploited, through 
the use of security, by coalitions of debtors and better-informed creditors. Related but distinct 
are those attacks on the priority of secured credit based not on the exploitation that it 
allegedly makes possible, but the inefficiency that it supposedly creates. These are also 
founded on identifying various types of ‘non-adjusting’ creditor – involuntary, small-claim 
holders, tax authorities, those who lend before secured credit is issued, etc. Critics argue that 
secured credit will sometimes be issued, not because it is socially value-maximising, but 
simply because it allows debtors and some creditors to drain away bankruptcy value from 
non-adjusting creditors. This leads to various types of inefficiency.  
 
 This paper conceive of the attack on the priority of secured credit as a search for 
someone to save. Critics of security would like to point to a group of creditors who are either 
harmed by the existence of security, or whose own existence allows security to wreak havoc 
with social efficiency to the detriment of all. If such a group could be identified, the critics 
would then be justified in recommending curtailment of (some of) the priority rights of those 
who offer and accept security. This paper examines the claims that such a group has been 
found, and finds reason to reject them all. Instead, it reaches the conclusion that the existence 
of the priority of secured credit is mutually value-enhancing for all those interested in the 
company’s undertaking. 
 
 
 
2. Tort creditors and the Exploitation Hypothesis 
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 Here is the basic insight on which the attacks on the priority of secured credit are based.14 
Consider the world of Debtor, who wishes to borrow from various Creditors. Creditors all 
start off being equal in every respect (including their share of the Debtor’s estate if the latter 
becomes insolvent). In this world, all Creditors are aware of Debtor’s dealings with all other 
Creditors, and each writes their loan contract with Debtor on the basis of, and relying on, this 
information. Now if one Creditor (called Bank) demands a security interest and the Debtor 
complies, all remaining Creditors realise they would have less distributed to them, should 
Debtor fail (what would have been available for distribution pari passu will first go towards 
satisfying Bank’s debt). But other Creditors are not harmed. They simply raise the interest 
rates they charge Debtor to compensate for the loss of insolvency value. It follows that, at its 
worst in this imagined world, security is absolutely harmless. 
 
 The assumptions just made are of course unrealistic, and this is what critics of 
security seize on. That not all creditors would be perfectly informed of their debtor’s 
behaviour, and separately, that not all of them would be able to modify their dealings with the 
debtor to compensate for the loss in insolvency value, is the basis for almost all the attacks on 
secured credit. In the real world, critics argue, secured credit can be used to siphon away 
insolvency value from certain types of unsecured creditor, to the debtor and secured 
creditors. The argument comes in two varieties, which will be called the Exploitation and the 
Inefficiency Hypotheses. This Section of this paper, and the next, deal with the first of these. 
In answering the question why parties sometimes agree to security arrangements, Lynn 
LoPucki has presented a ‘promising malignant explanation[] for the existence of secured 
debt’.15 He argues that ‘the deceptive nature of security enables secured creditors and debtors 
to extract a subsidy from those who involuntarily become unsecured creditors.’16 A similar 
subsidy is said to be extracted from ‘relatively uninformed unsecured creditors who 
predictably miscalculate their likelihoods of recovery.’17 ‘The ability to victimize [such] 
creditors’, claims LoPucki, ‘may in significant part explain why secured credit is such a 
widespread phenomenon.’18  
 
A. Secured Credit and Large Firms 
 
It would be useful to begin with an examination of the facts on which these arguments are 
based, and of their assumptions. It is important also to keep in mind these arguments were 
originally made in the US context. The same concerns have recently been voiced in this 
jurisdiction, notably by Finch in an exhaustive and helpful recent article.19 So we might wish 
to consider whether the differences between the two legal systems have an impact on the 
transferability of the arguments. 
 
 Let us start by identifying the categories of creditor supposedly ‘exploited’ through 
the use of security. LoPucki mentions eight such categories, whom he classifies as 
‘involuntary’ or ‘reluctant’.20 Without wishing to construct watertight categories, perhaps 
five could be regarded as ‘tort’ creditors, widely construed. These include product liability 
claimants, victims of business torts (‘ranging from negligence to intentional interference with 
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 contractual relations’), victims of antitrust violations, unfair competition, patent, trademark 
and copyright infringement, environmental agencies which perform clean-ups, and creditors 
who acquire that status because of the debtor’s fraud. The remaining categories consist of tax 
authorities and certain other government agencies, and utility companies. These are all to be 
considered ‘involuntary’, argues LoPucki, since they are ‘not in the business of extending 
credit and [do] not seek credit relationships.’21 
 
 LoPucki claims that ‘Any debtor who either has, or expects in the future to have, 
involuntary unsecured creditors will find economic advantage in “selling” secured status to 
its voluntary creditors.’22 He explains that to the extent that the debtor’s capital structure 
consists of equity, its shareholders are exposed to liability. Claims against the firm by 
involuntary creditors would be met out of the firm’s assets. This reduces the firm’s value and 
therefore directly hurts shareholders, the only other claimants to those assets. The existence 
of debt in the firm’s capital structure reduces shareholders’ ‘real exposure’ to that liability. 
‘Real exposure’ is that part of its tort liability that the debtor is forced to pay, rather than 
being able to defeat through declaring bankruptcy. So once debt has been issued, some of the 
firm’s value comes from creditors, and some of the involuntary claims would be met from 
that value. This line of reasoning indicates that the shareholders’ real exposure to tort 
liability is ‘almost eliminated’ once all of the tortfeasor’s assets, including its future stream 
of income, have been fully encumbered. Should involuntary claims now arise, and should 
shareholders wish the firm to avoid having to repay them, the firm can declare insolvency and 
shareholders can walk away without further liability to anyone.23 
 
 The simple example used by LoPucki illustrates nicely how the argument is supposed 
to work.24 D has assets of $100 and owes C a debt of $100. D’s activities then tortiously 
cause T an injury of $100, without thereby gaining D anything in return. D is subsequently 
liquidated with $100 of assets and $200 of debt. If C is unsecured, both it and T will receive 
$50 each. If C is secured, it receives everything, and T gets nothing. So D obviously has an 
incentive before the liquidation (for businesses expected to inflict such injuries, perhaps well 
before it) to offer C security. This is because C in return will offer a decrease in its interest 
charges to reflect the reduced risk of being left with less than full payment in D’s insolvency. 
Tort victim T, being an involuntary creditor, cannot of course raise its interest rates to 
compensate. So D pockets the difference. This subsidy, caused by the ‘externalization of tort 
risk’ onto T, creates incentives for firms to undertake more risk-laden projects.25 This will 
happen not because those projects are socially efficient, but simply because some of their 
costs are shifted onto involuntary third parties while the benefits go only to the tortfeasor’s 
shareholders. 
 
 It seems clear the ‘involuntary’ creditors who really concern LoPucki are tort 
victims.26 The example reproduced above, and the supporting literature he refers to,27 as well 
as most of his discussion, all are concerned overwhelmingly with tort liability. Further, the 
main thrust of his argument is that security allows additional ‘risk’ (meaning here the 
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 potential to cause tortious harm) to be created and externalised. This would generally 
describe the undertaking of riskier projects which would not otherwise have been undertaken, 
or projects which -- in the absence of secured creditors’ priority over ‘involuntary’ ones -- 
would have been executed in a less risky way, i.e. by employing more (costly) precautions. 
‘Involuntary’ liabilities which arise regardless of the riskiness of the company’s activities, 
e.g. utility bills and taxes, would not in most cases be covered by this line of argument. For 
this reason, the treatment here of the Exploitation Hypothesis focuses on tort creditors 
(construed broadly, as above).28  
 
 How, then, should LoPucki’s argument be evaluated? The charge is of course a 
serious one: that some (perhaps most) debtors who issue security do so in order to profit from 
inflicting uncompensated harm on others. To put into context the magnitude of this assertion, 
in the US, domestic borrowers alone are estimated to have about two trillion dollars of 
secured debt.29 Finch, who (as mentioned) has deployed LoPucki’s argument in relation to 
secured credit in England and regards it as part of ‘the core objection to the provision of 
security’,30 asserts that ‘Security taking is the norm in relation to most borrowings’.31 So 
English debtors too must be ‘victimizing’ tort creditors on a massive scale.32 Keeping in mind 
the gravity of this objection to security, we should perhaps begin by asking what evidence is 
presented in its support. 
 
 Citing US research which is supposed to have found twenty-three percent of the 
unsecured debt of consumer bankrupts to be owed to ‘reluctant’ creditors,33 LoPucki 
‘speculate[s] that money owed to reluctant creditors constitutes an even larger portion of the 
debt of financially distressed companies.’34 In support, he states that in a study of ‘the 43 
largest reorganizations of the 1980s’ (hereafter, the LoPucki-Whitford study), it was found 
that for two of the companies studied, more than two-thirds of the unsecured debt was 
‘involuntary’. These were Johns-Manville Corporation, ‘with well in excess of $2 billion in 
asbestos personal injury claims alone’, and Smith International, which had ‘a $205 million 
judgment against it for patent infringement.’35 Further, in ‘at least 7 more of [the] 43 
companies, management had fraudulently concealed the financial problems of the company 
in the period before bankruptcy, casting doubt on whether any of their unsecured creditors 
should be considered to have consented to the status they were given’. So overall and 
importantly, ‘in nearly a third of the cases [] studied, substantial portions of the unsecured 
debt were held by creditors who had not meaningfully agreed to their status as such.’36 
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  It would not be unfair to say this demonstration that corporate debtors engaged in 
formal bankruptcy proceedings have substantial ‘involuntary’ unsecured liabilities has 
entered the mythology of those supporting restrictions on secured credit. Apart from LoPucki 
himself, it is cited by Bebchuk and Fried (hereafter, ‘Bebchuk-Fried’) as part of their attack 
on security.37 Finch cites it no less than five times.38 Even those who are generally supportive 
of the priority of secured credit have been known to refer to it as indicating the possible 
malignant effects of security.39 No other evidence seems to be available to show that 
(especially in this jurisdiction) there are significant tort claims against companies in financial 
distress. As it is, the LoPucki-Whitford study has been used to back up all manner of 
proposals to cut down on the rights of secured creditors on both sides of the Atlantic.40 And 
in particular, it has widely been taken as proof that the ability of debtors to transfer value 
from ‘involuntary’ to secured creditors is in fact encouraging excessive amounts of corporate 
risk-taking and an unacceptable degree of uncompensated harm (including tortious harm). 
 
 Things, however, are not as they seem. The LoPucki-Whitford study, far from 
providing any support for the Exploitation Hypothesis, in fact goes some way towards 
disproving it. Let us begin by noting that the study focused on the ‘largest reorganizations of 
the 1980s’.41 It follows that each of the 43 companies studied had extensive business 
interests, and correspondingly, the capacity to incur substantial ‘involuntary’ debts. Save in 
the most exceptional circumstances, smaller companies simply would not have the ability 
(say) to inflict ‘well in excess of $2 billion’ of personal injuries, or face realistic claims of 
$205 million for patent infringement.42 The reader can be forgiven for thinking that to point 
this out is to state what is blatantly obvious. But here lies the problem for LoPucki’s thesis. It 
is universally acknowledged (even by critics of security) that the larger the company, the 
more unlikely it is to issue secured debt. 
 
 Here is some of the evidence. Bebchuk-Fried themselves have stated that ‘In the 
United States, large, publicly traded firms tend not to borrow on a secured basis’ and that 
‘most commercial secured debt [] is issued by small- and medium-sized companies.’43 Ronald 
Mann calls it ‘the most well-established aspect of [the] actual practice’ of lending that ‘the 
strongest companies in our economy ordinarily do not secure their debts.’44 Steven Schwarcz 
found in an analysis of fourteen investment grade public companies selected at random that 
‘with extremely limited exceptions, only their non-recourse debt is secured.’ He concluded 
that his research, though based on a small sample, ‘[did] suggest that investment grade 
companies have little or no secured debt and little non-recourse debt.’45 This is strongly 
supported by UK evidence. Ameziane Lasfer’s study of all the companies quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange in the 1984-96 period (for which the relevant data was available in 
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 machine-readable form) showed that “secured debt is negatively related to firm size; small 
firms hold more than three times [the amount of] secured debt than do larger companies. The 
proportion of small companies’ debt that is secured is 61%, while that of the larger 
companies is 17%.”46 
 
 Perhaps most interestingly, the LoPucki-Whitford study, on which most of the 
Exploitation Hypothesis is based,47 itself found that ‘many of [the large companies studied] 
issued little or no secured debt, even as they approached bankruptcy reorganization.’48 In 
particular, Johns-Manville Corporation, which LoPucki had earlier mentioned as a 
particularly good case in support of the Hypothesis because it had tort debts ‘well in excess 
of $2 billion’ and insufficient insurance cover (of ‘only approximately $700 million’)49, also 
‘had assets of $2.2 billion... and secured debt of approximately $40 million’.50 Smith 
International, the only other company mentioned in the study as having a huge tort judgment 
against it, actually paid 107.1 cents on the dollar to its unsecured creditors.51 Nor were these 
cases exceptional. LoPucki blandly states that ‘Liquidations of [many of the] companies [in 
the sample], even in bankruptcy, would yield substantial recoveries for unsecured 
creditors.’52 He notes that: 
 
In 28 of the 42 cases (67%) in which the debtor had bank debt, the primary banks 
were wholly or substantially unsecured as bankruptcy approached. The banks 
demanded security in at least 20 of the 28 cases (71%). The debtor refused to grant 
security in 10 of the 20 cases (50%). In five of the 10 cases in which security was 
granted shortly before bankruptcy, the bankruptcy was filed within the 90-day 
preferences period and the grant was attacked. [In fact], it would appear that 
companies are more likely to grant security when they avoid bankruptcy.53 
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 LoPucki, above n 1 at 1927 fn 153 (emphasis added). 
  
Further, of the seven companies whose unsecured creditors are regarded as ‘reluctant’ by 
LoPucki because they might have made their loans on the basis of fraudulent information 
provided by the debtor’s management, or the fraudulent concealment of information by it, 
two were solvent.54 The creditors of three others could expect ‘substantial’ recoveries from 
claims pursued by the debtor’s replacement management against its displaced one, or because 
the latter settled the administrative charges brought against them by the SEC, or both.55 So 
not only do we have no indication that these seven companies had issued substantial secured 
debt, there were, in addition, significant recoveries by the unsecured creditors of five of them 
in any case. 
 
 We should note the significance of this analysis. As mentioned, these are the very 
companies whose conditions have repeatedly been used to support versions of the 
Exploitation Hypothesis. These are also par excellence instances where (if the Hypothesis 
held, so that the existence of security is to be explained by virtue of its ability to shift costs 
onto ‘involuntary’ or ‘reluctant’ creditors) the managers and shareholders of these large firms 
would have the greatest incentive to issue secured debt, since they would have massive tort 
and other ‘involuntary’ liabilities to externalise. And yet secured borrowings were relatively 
minuscule and there were actually sufficient assets available to meet much of those liabilities. 
Secured debt was not then being used to externalise costs, nor were ‘involuntary’ creditors 
(of whatever description) being ‘victimized’. It must therefore be reasonable to conclude that 
the LoPucki-Whitford study provides no support at all for the Exploitation Hypothesis.  
 
 Further and importantly, we must note the differences between the US legal system, 
where LoPucki-Whitford’s data originates, and that prevalent in this jurisdiction, where, as 
noted above, it has recently been used as a basis for some arguments about secured credit. 
For the LoPucki-Whitford study, in cases where some of the management of the debtor was 
implicated in fraud, the authors themselves note that the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 
‘reorganization procedure sometimes enables managers to escape liability for their 
wrongdoing’, since the entrenchment of existing management brought about by that 
procedure ‘gives even badly tainted managers leverage to negotiate their exit’. The managers 
may be able to employ this leverage to demand ‘a release of liability’, or to ‘hinder[] or 
delay[] actions by defrauded creditors and shareholders’.56 In this jurisdiction, by contrast, 
the ‘existing management out’ response of formal insolvency procedures makes such activity 
much more unlikely. To the extent that the knowledge that, should their firm enter a formal 
proceeding, they would necessarily be displaced by an independent party, feeds into the 
decision-making of managers ex ante, they have a stronger incentive (compared to their US 
counterparts) not to engage in such activities in the first place. This weakens even further 
whatever force LoPucki’s arguments might have in the US context. 
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bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies’ (1993) 141 U Pennsylvania LR 669, 738, 
fnn 226-7, and LoPucki-Whitford, above n 51 at 166, Table IV(A). 
55
 LoPucki-Whitford, above n 54 at 738-9, including fnn 227-8. One of these companies was EPIC; 
accurate information about the expected total dividend paid to its unsecured creditors was not available; 
LoPucki-Whitford, above n 51 at 141 fn 33. So their total recoveries may or may not have been even 
greater than the ‘significant’ damages won on their (and the other claimants’) behalf by the replacement 
management. Of the remaining three, for two companies, Technical Equities and Baldwin-United, 
taking into account both the proceeds of the actions against the debtors’ displaced management and 
dividends from reorganisation, their unsecured creditors recovered in excess of 50 cents on the dollar 
on their outstanding debts against the insolvent debtor; see ibid at 142 Table III. The value of the 
settlement in case of the third, Nucorp, was $41m, and this went to the shareholders, the plaintiffs in the 
class action there; see LoPucki-Whitford, above n 54 at 738 fn 227. 
56
 Ibid at 739-40, including fnn 229-32. 
 B. Strategic Liquidation and Small Firms 
 
Suppose now that the defender of the Hypothesis were to concede that large companies do 
not generally issue secured debt, so the Hypothesis does not apply to them. But it could still 
apply to smaller firms, who might well have resorted to significant amounts of secured credit. 
Their motivation might be to ‘sell’ the insolvency share of tort creditors to others by issuing 
security. However, this suggestion seems to have its own problems. We should recall that the 
Hypothesis turns on the ability of shareholders to reduce their ‘real exposure’ to tort liability 
etc. It would be no good engaging in excessively risky activities and acquiring a reduction in 
the price of credit by issuing security, only to have the savings paid out as compensation to 
all those affected by the excessive risks taken. So for the argument to work, it must be 
possible ‘to defeat [the liability] through insolvency or bankruptcy’:57 
 
To freeze out their involuntary creditors, firms would have to incur secured debt to the 
liquidation value of their assets and be willing to go through some kind of liquidation 
if the involuntary creditors refused to settle.58 
 
A firm must be willing to liquidate in order to nullify its tort liability by means of an 
all-secured debt capital structure.59 
 
However, for smaller firms, especially those which have operated sufficiently long and 
widely to have incurred significant ‘involuntary’ (in particular, tort) liabilities, the costs to 
the firm’s decision-makers associated with liquidating it are likely to be significant. The 
managers of smaller firms, especially those becoming subject to insolvency proceedings in 
this country, are very likely to have a substantial equity stake in their company.60 Such 
shareholder-managers would also have firm-specific skills and idiosyncratic value invested in 
it.61 Very frequently, they would have guaranteed some of their company’s debt,62 and many 
would also have lent it significant amounts.63 So a significant proportion of their wealth, 
material and non-pecuniary, is likely to be invested in the firm, and this investment will be 
undiversified. For this reason, far from being all too ready to liquidate them strategically, 
shareholder-managers ‘can be expected to fight [] single-mindedly to keep [them] afloat.’64 It 
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 should be clear the (non-legal) costs of liquidation to them are likely in most cases to be very 
high indeed. 
 
 Consider also the differences in the legal context in which the Exploitation 
Hypothesis was originally expounded, and here in England where it is now being deployed. 
One significant difference is the ‘existing management out’ approach of English insolvency 
law, which stands in stark contrast to Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 
perversely ‘provides a vehicle for a liquidation that can discharge unsecured creditors even 
while the owner-managers retain control.’65 If that were not enough, bankruptcy courts 
frequently allow the ‘absolute priority rule’ (requiring senior claimants to be fully paid off 
before junior classes receive anything) to be breached in return for ‘new value’, so that 
shareholder-managers may retain an equity interest even though creditors are not fully paid.66 
So the costs to ‘owner’-managers of ‘liquidation’ in the US, in terms of equity interest, job 
security and firm-specific human capital, are noticeably lower than in England.67 In addition, 
LoPucki states that tort creditors may have little protection from the law if ‘an initially 
adequately capitalized corporation [] sank into insolvency and continued to operate in that 
condition’ merely on the basis of the gain derived from externalising tort liability.68 Here, of 
course, directors would be under the obligation, once there remained no reasonable prospect 
of avoiding insolvent liquidation, to take all the steps they reasonably ought to, to minimise 
harm to unsecured creditors. Any default on this obligation could be punished by an award of 
personal liability against them.69 Yet another difference lies in the attitude of the two 
jurisdictions towards the granting of security to cover antecedent debts, another step in the 
process through which (LoPucki maintains) tort risks can be externalised: ‘Granting security 
for an antecedent debt will never run afoul of [the relevant fraudulent transfer] provision 
because... value is given if an antecedent debt is secured’.70 In England, this would be liable 
to be challenged as a voidable preference by the liquidator.71 With respect, these differences 
between the two jurisdictions may not have received the attention they deserve from those 
attempting to transplant the Exploitation Hypothesis to this country. 
 
 Consider the implications of the points just made. All the costs mentioned above 
(legal and otherwise) must be weighed in the scales against the benefits to be derived from 
liquidating a company in order to externalise tort and other liabilities. For smaller companies 
(i.e. most of those likely to become subject to insolvency law), the costs are significant, as 
already noted. Their shareholder-managers would lose their jobs, their equity stake, and 
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 substantial undiversified firm-specific wealth.72 They might also become subject to legal 
liability. Creditors who accept security in such circumstances might face the possibility of 
having the objectionable transactions reversed. So the expected benefits from the 
externalisation of tort risks etc. would have to be very substantial to outweigh the expected 
costs. However, as already noted, smaller firms are unlikely to be able to operate on a scale 
large enough to incur extensive involuntary debts.73 Now recall that the benefits of risk 
externalisation are supposed to arise from the reduction in interest rates on secured loans.74 
These ‘subsidies’ are likely to be very small in comparison with the costs of liquidation. 
 
 To illustrate this point, here is a simple example to work through. Given that most 
firms have less than £1 million of total liabilities when they become subject to insolvency 
proceedings, give LoPucki the benefit of the doubt by assuming a fairly large secured loan 
from Lender to Debtor which will stand at £500,000 at the time of liquidation.75 Now banks 
do not lend at all, secured or unsecured, at rates 7.5% over base rate.76 Let the base rate be 
8%. Assume that without security, Debtor would only be able to borrow at the rate of 15% 
(i.e. at about the limit beyond which banks refuse to lend) because of the riskiness of its 
proposed project, but with security, the rate falls incredibly to 10% (this again gives LoPucki 
benefit of the doubt by maximising the interest rate benefit of security).77 Debtor is to remain 
in business for ten years before liquidating.78 This gives a generously long period for the 
objectionable ‘subsidy’ to continue and allows for plenty of ‘involuntary’ debts to be 
accumulated. Note though that almost inevitably, this also increases the costs of liquidation 
in terms of the shareholder-manager’s human capital and idiosyncratic investments. Lender 
lends in four equal instalments at 2.5 year intervals starting in the first year, and let us assume 
(in LoPucki’s favour) that the whole of the capital is outstanding at the end of the period. The 
total ‘subsidy’ is therefore £156,250.79 This figure is by no means negligible, even if the 
‘saving’ accrues over ten years. In return for this sum, however, which results from stated 
and un-stated assumptions incredibly favourable to his thesis, LoPucki’s argument requires 
the shareholder-manager to incur tort debts and then liquidate his firm, thereby losing 
material and non-pecuniary investments worth a decade of his life and risking legal liability. 
In light of this example,80 it is fairly certain that for shareholder-managers of smaller firms, 
                                               
72
 This argument may not apply when what is liquidated is a subsidiary company. However, remember 
that what is being challenged here is the claim that the Exploitation Hypothesis explains the ubiquity of 
secured credit, that the type of company which most often borrow secured and most often become 
insolvent are SME’s, and that there are unlikely to be many SME’s whose corporate and debt structures 
render them tort judgment proof in this way. At the very least, no evidence to this effect is provided by 
the critics of security. 
73
 In fact, an overwhelming number of firms in insolvency proceedings (81%) have liabilities less than 
£1 million, and less than 5% have liabilities of more than £5 million; see SPI, Survey of Company 
Insolvency: 8th. Survey (1999), p. 7. 
74
 This crucial issue of the relationship between secured credit and interest rates is taken up in Section 
4, below. 
75
 Overall, average individual debts range from £6,000 among property companies to £484,000 in 
construction; SPI, above n 73 at 9. 
76
 Bank of England, Finance for Small Firms: A Seventh Report, January 2000, p. 19. The explanation 
for this ceiling is probably that high rates invite adverse selection and create moral hazard; see below. 
77
 The mean margin over base rate for banks was 3.4% in the first half of 1999; see ibid at 19. For firms 
in financial distress, one important recent study found the interest rate spread was less than 4%; see 
Franks and Sussman, above n 63 at 13 Table 8, and 19 Table 10a (this study is discussed in greater 
detail below). In our example, the margin is a low 2% after security is given. 
78
 74% of firms in insolvency proceedings are ten years of age or less; SPI, above n 73 at 8. 
79
 (5% x 125,000 x 10) + (5% x 125,000 x 7.5) + (5% x 125,000 x 5) + (5% x 125,000 x 2.5). 
80
 The reader is invited to modify the figures to identify the parameters within which the benefits of the 
‘subsidy’ intuitively seem to outweigh the costs of liquidation to shareholder-managers. The author 
makes the statement to which this note is attached after having performed this exercise. 
 externalisation-motivated liquidation would very rarely (if ever at all) be a viable 
proposition.81 
 
 Here, then, are the reasons why LoPucki’s arguments apply to a null set. Large firms 
with potentially a large number of involuntary creditors do not give security even when 
facing very extensive such liabilities, and mostly end up paying those debts. Smaller firms, 
which do issue secured debt and which constitute an overwhelming proportion of the subjects 
of insolvency law, do not ordinarily have the capacity to incur involuntary debts large enough 
to render attractive any externalisation-motivated attempt to liquidate. The Exploitation 
Hypothesis is therefore left with no part of the corporate world to which to apply. Therefore, 
it certainly does not explain ‘why secured credit is such a widespread phenomenon.’82 And 
because of the differences in the two legal systems, this is even truer here than in the US.83 
 
 What about evidence? We can to a certain extent test the Hypothesis using empirical 
data from this jurisdiction. LoPucki would explain the pattern by which security becomes 
widely-employed by asserting that [A] firms would reduce equity in their capital structure, 
[B] create large amounts of tort liability, [C] ‘incur secured debt to the liquidation value of 
their assets’, and then [D] undergo an insolvent liquidation.84 As more and more firms 
discovered this easy way of making a profit, [E] the trend would be for firms to be 
increasingly tort judgment-proof: 
 
Equilibrium would be an all-secured debt capital structure because real tort exposure 
would be zero. Any change in that capital structure would increase real tort exposure. 
Reputational concerns would tend to disappear in the intense competition of a world 
where transaction costs are small.85 
 
But for small firms, which are the most likely to be liquidated insolvent, the trend is actually 
towards more equity and more internal finance in the firm’s capital structure (therefore, more 
real exposure to tort liability). In the 1987-90 period, 65% of small businesses sought 
external financing of whatever type. In 1995-97, this figure had fallen dramatically to only 
39%.86 Since equity is (and even more strongly, shareholder-managers’ own funds are) not 
being reduced as a proportion of small firm capital structure, and since the trend is in the 
opposite direction, Propositions A and E are false. Further, according to the Hypothesis, it 
would be clearly more rewarding for businesses to shut down only once a substantial number 
of ‘involuntary’ (especially tort) claimants had been swept up in its liability net and the firm 
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 was insolvent. However, twelve times as many businesses close without defaulting on any 
debts, as those that become insolvent.87 So Proposition D is palpably false. We do not know 
how many tort debts go unpaid in liquidation, and the data relied on by the supporters of the 
Exploitation Hypothesis shows when there are large liabilities of this nature, little secured 
debt is issued and those liabilities are mostly met. So Proposition B is either false, or more 
charitably, unproved. It must be said however that the likelihood of its being true is very 
remote indeed, for the reasons suggested above. We are left with Proposition C, that firms 
would issue secured debt to the liquidation value of their assets before liquidating. Even if 
true, this by itself would just beg the question, since why this should be so is precisely what 
the other -- false -- parts of the Hypothesis were trying to explain. Based on these predictions 
and data at least, few things are as demonstrably wrong in the debate about secured lending 
as the claim that it exists to externalise risk onto tort (or other ‘involuntary’) creditors. 
 
Even apart from all this, there is an additional reason to question the proposition that 
the existence of the priority of secured claims leads to the exploitation of tort creditors in 
insolvency. This is because, in this jurisdiction, most tort creditors are unlikely to bear the 
insolvency risk of their debtors in the first place, regardless of whether the latter have 
borrowed secured. Here is why. While we face once again the problem that little empirical 
evidence is available on this point, it is very likely that most tort claims arise either from 
diseases contracted or injuries sustained at the workplace, or from road accidents. And in 
both situations, the claim would be covered by extensive compulsory insurance schemes. In 
the employment context, the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1998 
now require most employers to have a minimum cover of £5m for all risks. This is 
complimented by the ‘no-fault’ Industrial Injuries Scheme. As for road accidents, the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 requires that users of motor vehicles secure unlimited cover in respect of 
death or personal injury.88 In either case, and should the insured party become insolvent, the 
Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 effects a statutory transfer to the victim of 
the right to recover from the insurer.89 In addition, section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 
restricts the insurers’ ability to refuse to pay the injured person on the basis that they would 
have been entitled to cancel or avoid the insurance contract as against the insured. Finally, 
even if the driver involved in a road accident is uninsured or untraced, the victim may have 
recourse against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau to make good his loss.90 The cumulative effect of 
these provisions is to move the risk of the tort-feasor’s insolvency from the victim to the 
insurer. This also means that any alleged “subsidy” that might have been created by 
subordinating tort claims to secured ones disappears: it is a fair bet the debtor’s insurers 
would set premiums taking into account the level of risk associated with its business.91 
 
 If there is any concern that secured credit is purposely being used to defeat 
‘involuntary’ liabilities on a large scale in this jurisdiction (as the Exploitation Hypothesis 
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 suggests), then it is surely imperative that empirical research be conducted to test whether 
that is the case. In particular, if significant amounts of tort debts are regularly going unpaid in 
corporate liquidations while secured creditors sweep up everything, that deserves to be a 
scandal and we should hear about it. However, such an argument (and a rather serious 
charge) would be difficult to sustain on the strength of a study based in a very different legal 
system; it could not be made at all on the basis of evidence that seems in fact to repudiate the 
argument. Nor can this evidence be employed to justify proposals to ‘improve’ the institution 
of secured credit, especially to ‘protect’ tort victims.92 It is suggested that unless hard facts 
and more persuasive arguments are forthcoming, the Exploitation Hypothesis should be 
retired from service. Tort claimants not being available for this purpose, critics of security 
must find someone else to save from secured creditors.93 
 
3. Exploitation and ‘uninformed’ creditors 
 
In view of the analysis above and given the present state of evidence and arguments, it is 
submitted the Exploitation Hypothesis is somewhat lacking in plausibility. That conclusion 
should carry over to this Section. Here, the exploitation is supposed to be of ‘incompetent’94 
creditors who systematically underestimate the risk of the debtor’s business and who 
therefore charge less than they would if they could make a more accurate assessment. The 
argument is that the debtor can (as before) sell their insolvency share to secured creditors 
who, upon receiving security, do not then raise their rates (since their claims are not diluted 
by the addition of claims held by these ‘incompetent’ creditors), while enjoying under-priced 
loans from such creditors in the first place. The blame, it seems, lies with the deceptive 
nature of the institution of secured credit. 
 
 It should be clearly understood that the dispute here is about the existence of a class 
of creditor that is ‘uninformed’ about the need to deal with risk, and of the consequences of 
the existence of security. No one would deny that some creditors often do not have all the 
relevant information about a particular debtor. There is every reason to think there are 
informational asymmetries of this sort, both between creditor and debtor, and between 
different types of creditor.95 Rather, the controversy (insofar as it touches this point) concerns 
the argument that some creditors do not even realise the existence of such asymmetries, nor 
the consequences of their debtor’s having borrowed on a secured basis, do not react 
appropriately in response, and are ‘exploited’ as a result. 
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 A. Uninformed In The Market 
 
It has to be said that the argument just summarised does not seem free of difficulties. First 
and importantly, it seems to ignore the fact that the required ability to deal with risk is not 
specific to the peculiarities of any one aspect of the legal system. So for example, a creditor 
would have to calculate the probability of its debtor’s insolvency, or at least the average rate 
of default in its industry, even if there were no secured credit. It remains to be demonstrated 
that parties who can do this cannot then assimilate and react to the simple fact that general 
unsecured creditors do not often get anything in their debtor’s (insolvent) liquidation. And 
contrary to this argument’s basic premise, ‘it is generally acknowledged that small firms 
today are more professionally managed -- by people with more business acumen -- and 
assisted by a wider network of support agencies.’96 There is little reason to think this is any 
less true for firms that have to extend credit (probably almost all of them).  
 
 Further, LoPucki does not quite succeed in revealing who these ‘uninformed’ 
creditors are. The evidence he cites even for the existence of such creditors is, at its highest, 
anecdotal.97 LoPucki mentions a reported case as demonstrating the potential for exploitation 
of ‘uninformed’ creditors. However, as he himself notes, there was no ‘exploitation’ even 
there; the eventual decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois ensured that in fact, the 
‘uninformed’ creditor prevailed!98 The LoPucki-Whitford study is also brandished again to 
show that ‘in 4 of the 43 cases [] studied (9%), the CEOs were indicted for fraud against 
creditors. In several others, the SEC brought administrative charges for such fraud.’99 But of 
course this is all quite irrelevant as an argument against secured credit, the amount of 
secured debt being relatively minuscule for almost all the firms in the study.100 Again, if the 
argument is meant to show that secured credit exists (at least in part) to sell the share of 
‘uninformed’ creditors to secured ones, the study itself consists of stunning counter-
examples. 
 
 Given that the identification of ‘uninformed’ creditors is hazy at best and the 
evidence cited is inappropriate, this part of LoPucki’s argument might well have been treated 
as no more than an irrelevance here. As it happens, though, Finch has seized on the basic 
insight that there might be a significant number of ‘unsophisticated’ creditors ready to be 
taken advantage of by security in this jurisdiction. She seems to make several arguments 
premised on the existence of parties who act as if they were ‘uninformed’, either because of 
personal or market reasons.101 Remember that they all aim to show how some players in the 
market systematically under-price their loans, thus allowing coalitions of debtors and 
security-holders to appropriate a part of their bankruptcy value. 
 
 First, Finch envisages a voluntary creditor who anticipates clearly that the granting of 
security by its debtor to another of its creditors would make its own position worse off. To 
compensate, it realises it should adjust the terms on which it does business in order to make 
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 up for the expected loss of insolvency value. However, the industry in which it trades 
contains ‘ill-informed and cavalier [operators who] may be willing to offer terms that 
undercut [our wiser but impotent protagonist] in the market. The [latter] will, accordingly, 
feel that it cannot adjust and, indeed, that resources spent on evaluating the need for 
adjustment... would be wasted.’ The same calculation is made by many (or most) operators in 
the industry. This state of affairs is undesirable.102 
 
 The obvious reply must, with respect, be that operators who are ‘cavalier’ about 
accepting unjustified risks would soon go out of business, while the prudent operator who 
expends resources adjusting to risks would be rewarded with higher profits and commercial 
longevity. Finch herself notes a paragraph later that some ‘trade creditors [would] have gone 
out of business through their failure to adjust -- perhaps in their early weeks and years.’ She 
uses this as yet another argument against secured credit, stating that ‘These lost enterprises 
involve costs to society.’103 This is hard to understand. On her premises, in fact, such trade 
creditors should systematically include (by definition, since we are concerned with risk) a far 
higher proportion of those being ‘cavalier’ about it than those dealing with it prudently. 
Indeed, the more cavalier the operator or the more ill-informed it is about the consequences 
of its decisions, the more hasty should be its demise.104 The trend should be for the market to 
be purged of the cavalier and the ill-informed. The persistence in the market of such actors 
seems unlikely to account for the existence of security, nor does it seem likely to provide a 
significant source of exploitation. 
 
 Finch asserts that some ‘ill-informed and ill-equipped’ parties may be unable to 
adjust and unable to learn because they ‘operate in dispersed, changing markets in which 
learning is difficult, the process of matching prices to risks may take a long time and may be 
delayed, distorted or prevented by changes of actors and the arrival in the market of numbers 
of unsophisticated operators who fail adequately to consider risks.’105 This argument is, with 
great respect, not entirely satisfactory. What are these ‘dispersed, changing markets in which 
learning is difficult’, and in which industry do they exist?106 Why are parties compelled to 
operate in the whole of these dispersed markets? Parties who suffered from having to operate 
thus would soon specialise in one (or some) sector(s), thereby improving their ability to learn 
and adjust. Or some newcomers -- though aware that operators in this industry traditionally 
traded widely -- would be forced through financial constraints to start out on a small scale in 
one such sector (or in fewer ones than is customary), and would find (on Finch’s 
assumptions) that they did better than competitors struggling in many different ones. Others 
would be likely to learn from their success and follow their example. Alternatively, suppose 
it is impossible (say for technological reasons) to specialise in some of these ‘dispersed’ 
markets rather than operating in them all. If so, the costs arising from the drawn out process 
of ‘matching prices to risks’ cannot be regarded as objectionable, since ex hypothesi these 
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 costs cannot be avoided by any of the relevant players. It is submitted none of this constitutes 
an argument against the priority of secured claims. 
 
B. Uninformed Because ‘Unsophisticated’ 
 
Consider now the argument that, to this author at least, seems to have truly startling 
implications. The claim is that there might be ‘a permanent subsidy to borrowers’ because of 
the continuous flow into the market of ‘ill-informed and ill-equipped parties’.107 Parties who 
are merely ‘ill-informed’ because of market reasons would soon become informed; otherwise 
they would go out of business. So let us now focus on parties which are ‘ill-equipped’, 
presumably because of personal reasons, to learn from the markets etc.108 The assertion that 
these parties exist in the marketplace in significant numbers is meant to support proposals to 
‘improve’ the system of secured credit to ‘protect’ them.109 Disregard for the moment that 
because of the purging effect of the market, such individuals are unlikely to be numerous at 
any given time, so that ‘victimizing’ them through the use of security is unlikely to be a 
profitable pursuit, and therefore unlikely to explain the ubiquity of secured credit.110  
 
 So the argument is that certain players enter into business some part of which 
requires them to extend credit. This in turn means they must understand (inter alia) how 
security operates in that industry, what are the laws governing its use, what the rates of 
default and of insolvency are in it, what commercial actors can expect if they do not have 
security and their debtor becomes insolvent, and if possible, what is the likelihood of their 
particular debtor defaulting or becoming insolvent. However, the players we are concerned 
with are ‘ill-equipped’ to meet (some of) these requirements. This means they underestimate 
the prices they should charge in order to be compensated, should their debtor become 
insolvent at some point after having issued secured credit. It also means they are ejected from 
the market more frequently than other players not as ‘ill-equipped’ as them. This leads to the 
conclusion that the institution of secured credit is both exploitative and inefficient. 
 
 This argument is troublesome. For one thing, the need to deal with risk is not related 
to the institution of secured credit, as already noted, and would inevitably exist even if no one 
ever lent secured. At least in a market economy, some business ventures would succeed and 
others fail,111 and those deciding to enter the market would have to make judgements about 
the likelihood of failure of their proposed business partners (their suppliers and buyers). 
Given the ever-present possibility of failure, they would be reckless indeed not to think of 
what would happen, should failure strike those they do business with. Such considerations 
would include questions about the resilience of their own venture in such circumstances. 
Further, if the economy is based on credit, the possibility of insolvency must be thrown into 
the mix. Business people must school themselves in the art of deciding what they should 
charge for their product, taking into account all these complexities of commercial life. The 
existence of secured credit simply is not implicated in the story so far. Once it is introduced, 
firms must learn to survive despite not being paid much on their outstanding loans to their 
counter-party (there would be some loss from a counter-party’s insolvency, even if the latter 
had never borrowed on a secured basis). Parties ‘ill-equipped’ to deal with this rather trivial 
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 additional complexity are unlikely to do much better even if the institution of security did not 
exist.112 
 
 Suppose though that we accept that such ‘ill-equipped’ actors do occasionally enter 
the market, do then create a ‘subsidy’ for others by under-pricing their loans, and are ejected 
from the market quicker than others. Does this mean the institution of secured credit, perhaps 
by hastening their demise, is exploitative or inefficient, and ought therefore to be reformed? 
It should be noted first of all how difficult it is to assess the merits of such a suggestion. 
Suppose the level of protection accorded to ‘ill-equipped’ parties from the effects of secured 
credit were to be significantly increased. Some creditors would still inevitably fall below the 
threshold of that protection. What happens then? Since it is probably impossible to guarantee 
that no one would ever be ‘taken advantage of’ because of their inability to deal with 
commercial uncertainty and risk, or because of their ignorance of how banks operate, or 
because of their misinterpretation of the law of secured credit etc., all we could do would be 
to alter the threshold below which protection is denied. But for all we know, that threshold 
might lie roughly at the right level today. On this point, the most that can be said in favour of 
those proposing ‘reform’ on these grounds is that we cannot be certain, since they do not 
provide any information about how many such ‘ill-equipped’ creditors there might be today. 
This also means we cannot know how much ‘protective’ regulation should be added to cut 
down the number of those ‘exploited’ by way of secured credit by (say) one-half. 
 
What is more, it does not seem to this author desirable for the law to ensure that 
members of society continue for as long as possible to do what ex hypothesi they are not very 
good at doing. Society has adopted the attitude that individuals are generally not to be 
prevented from entering the occupation of their choice. However, this same freedom 
necessitates that one must also face up to the consequences of that choice. So until society 
decides to abandon the position that the market should be allowed to encourage those not 
terribly good in their chosen profession to apply their talents elsewhere, surely no such 
argument would be persuasive in the debate about secured credit. Nothing justifies isolating 
‘unsophisticated’ unsecured creditors from plumbers, actors, and soccer players of 
comparable abilities, so it is submitted that nothing requires them to be shielded from the 
consequences of their decisions any more than all others. Further and importantly, if the 
argument is that some business people cannot comprehend how security operates, can they 
understand and comply with tax and VAT, health and safety, consumer and environmental 
protection requirements, which are unlikely to be any less complicated? Those proposing 
‘reform’ to the institution of secured credit on these grounds must surely bear the burden of 
demonstrating that all these issues can be satisfactorily addressed. 
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 4. ‘Non-adjusting’ creditors, the Inefficiency Hypothesis, and the rate 
reduction assumption 
 
Bebchuk and Fried have given the most systematic statement of what here will be called the 
Inefficiency Hypothesis.113 They argue that ‘under the rule of full priority, the creation of a 
security interest diverts value from creditors that do not “adjust” the size of their claims to 
take into account the effect of the loan transaction that creates the security interest’.114 
Security allows the debtor to transfer to secured creditors some of the insolvency value of 
such ‘non-adjusters’. In return, the secured creditor charges them a lower rate of interest, 
reflecting the fact that its claim would not now have to rank pari passu with those of non-
adjusting creditors. A ‘non-adjusting’ creditor, then, is one who ‘cannot or does not adjust 
the terms of its loan to reflect the effect on its loan of all the arrangements the borrower 
enters into with other creditors, including the creation of security interests which, under full 
priority, completely subordinate the nonadjusting creditor’s claim in bankruptcy.’115 
 
 Bebchuk and Fried are more at ease than LoPucki accepting that security might be 
beneficial and efficient as well as merely redistributive (from non-adjusting creditors to 
debtor and secured creditor) and inefficient. They explain that since the security interest 
encumbers the collateral and affords the secured creditor both a superior remedy and priority 
to the proceeds of its realisation, it reduces the borrower’s ability to overinvest by selling 
those assets and embarking on an inefficient project. It discourages asset dilution by way of 
transfer of those assets to the debtor’s shareholders. It reduces the costs to the secured debtor 
of dealing with a default. Security also discourages inefficient behaviour on part of the debtor 
by increasing the expected costs of non-compliance with value-increasing covenants in the 
loan contract.116 
 
 Here is how the inefficiencies are supposed to arise. Bebchuk and Fried accept that to 
the extent that security increases the wealth of all the parties, it is of course desirable. But 
security interests will be granted beyond this point not because of their social benefit, but 
simply because they allow the debtor to reduce its own financing costs by selling the 
insolvency share of non-adjusters. On the margins, therefore, the role of security is merely 
redistributive. And second, security interests would sometimes be used precisely for 
redistributive purposes when debtor misbehaviour might more effectively have been 
controlled by use of non-security covenants.117 
 
This, then, is the Inefficiency Hypothesis, and we must decide what to make of it. It is 
submitted the Hypothesis is seriously undermined – at least as it applies to this jurisdiction – 
by empirical evidence now available. However, the same evidence also calls into question 
one of the most deeply embedded and seemingly obvious intuitions underlying the debate 
about security. This is what we must begin by unearthing. It is important to notice the 
structure of the argument above. According to Bebchuk and Fried, the existence of secured 
credit does allow the secured creditor to control debtor misbehaviour. This benefits all of 
those with claims against the latter, and therefore maximises social value. The secured 
creditor-to-be anticipates the lower costs to it of administering this loan in the way described 
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 above, and of an increase in its share of bankruptcy value, and so lowers the interest it 
charges. The debtor for its part offers security to enjoy the benefits of this lower interest rate. 
As the argument is presented, the problem arises only after all the gains from the secured 
creditor’s ability to control debtor misbehaviour have accrued. Beyond this point, the secured 
creditor will lend cheaper on a secured rather than unsecured basis only because the priority 
associated with secured status allows it to obtain a greater part of the debtor’s estate, should 
the latter become insolvent. And the debtor still has an incentive to offer security because of 
the attraction of cheaper loans from the secured creditor. Now security is doing nothing but 
transferring bankruptcy value from one set of creditors to another. The losers in this process 
can do nothing about it since, ex hypothesi, they are unable to adjust the terms on which they 
lend.118 
 
Now, the linchpin of this argument, the assumption that does all the work here, is the 
obvious one that secured credit is cheaper than unsecured credit. Call this the ‘rate reduction 
assumption’. The assumption seems reasonable: after all, having priority does (by definition) 
improve a creditor’s position in its debtor’s insolvency compared to what it would otherwise 
be. So this difference must obviously be reflected in the price to be charged for debt. Of 
course if there were no difference in rates between secured and unsecured debt, then this 
argument simply would not work. It is important to understand why. If the assumption holds, 
secured creditors-to-be are indifferent between being asked to lend unsecured and charging a 
high interest rate on the one hand, and taking security and reducing the price of their loan on 
the other. It is the debtor that has an incentive to offer security, precisely because it can 
pocket the difference in interest rates. If there were no difference between borrowing secured 
and borrowing unsecured, there would from the debtor’s perspective be a strong disincentive 
to offer security. We should remember that on Bebchuk and Fried’s premises, security has 
two broad roles. It may facilitate a transfer of bankruptcy value from non-adjusting to secured 
creditors, but this transfer is consummated only once the debtor becomes insolvent. While it 
is still solvent, however, security allows the secured creditor to restrict the debtor’s freedom 
of action, preventing it from engaging in over-investment, asset dilution, and because of the 
‘hostage’ role of security, extracting from it scrupulous compliance with debt covenants. The 
debtor’s shareholder-managers suffer from the existence of security, on Bebchuk-Fried’s 
view. So they must be compensated handsomely through a reduction in price of the now-
secured loan, if the debtor is to offer security at all.119 
 
The rate reduction assumption is quite crucial to these major attacks on security, 
then.120 And so strongly accepted is it that the defence of the priority of secured credit in this 
paper so far has also proceeded as if it were true.121 Yet it is now contended that there is 
reason to think the way this assumption operates in the attacks on security is quite fallacious 
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 (at least in the English context). The evidencefor this is discussed below. It would be helpful 
first to set the theoretical context of this relationship between risk, interest rates and security. 
 
Let us start by disentangling two distinct factors that might be at play in determining 
whether the rate reduction assumption is valid. The first one, which the literature refers to as 
financial agency costs, has already been mentioned. The debtor’s management has an 
incentive to engage in behaviour harmful to its creditors. They might ‘overinvest’ by putting 
the borrowed capital in projects with a negative present value, or dilute the existing lenders’ 
claims by borrowing more, or simply by distributing corporate assets to shareholders in the 
form of excessive dividend payments. Since all these activities increase the prior lenders’ 
risk, those capable of adjusting their rates would have an incentive to demand a higher 
interest rate at the time the loan is made. Now to the extent that security mitigates this risk 
(by discouraging misbehaviour), it serves as a substitute for a higher interest rate. Very 
simply put, a secured loan is for this reason likely to be cheaper than an unsecured one, all 
other things being equal. But as already pointed out above, to the extent that this factor 
explains the relative cheapness of secured debt, it is accepted by critics like Bebchuk-Fried to 
be beneficial to all of the firm’s creditors, unsecured as well as secured (since financial 
agency costs hurt them all). 
 
But the second of the two factors just mentioned might ensures that the relationship 
between security and interest rates is not always inverse. From the lender’s perspective, and 
focussing for a moment only on unsecured loans, raising interest rates beyond a certain point 
might well be self-defeating. This is because potential borrowers who offer to pay more ex 
ante, may not end up paying more ex post. Those offering to borrow at higher interest rates 
might be willing to do so only because they intend to undertake riskier projects, or are over-
estimating the success or profitability of their projects, or are simply dishonest. It follows that 
as the interest rates charged by a lender creep up, the average quality of its borrower would 
tend to decline. This adverse selection effect also means that as interest rates increase, less 
risky borrowers would drop out of the market, finding credit to be prohibitively expensive 
(remember that their lower-risk projects also yield lower returns). What is more, rates 
increased in order to compensate the borrower against the risk of debtor misbehaviour, might 
in fact generate additional motivation costs, as debtors are pushed into taking excessive risks 
to finance the higher costs of borrowing. Instead of compensating the lender for its portfolio 
risk, then, high interest rates might increase that risk. One way of avoiding this ‘moral 
hazard’ problem would be for the lender to ‘ration’ credit instead of raising rates. Keeping 
the rates lower would attract better-quality borrowers back into the market. It would also 
ensure, however, that some good potential borrowers who nevertheless have an ex ante risk 
profile necessitating a somewhat higher rate do not obtain credit.122 
 
Introducing security back into the picture, we can now see that it might sometimes 
substitute, not for higher interest rates, but for refusing credit altogether. Some loans might 
be made because the lender’s ex ante risk is mitigated by the priority it would now enjoy in 
any subsequent insolvency, when without that priority, an ‘adequate’ interest rate would be 
beyond the level where the adverse selection and moral hazard problems become acute. 
Importantly for our purposes, it should be noted that in this situation, the rate reduction 
assumption turns out to be the rate reduction fallacy. Here, the choice would not be between 
borrowing at a high rate without offering security, and obtaining a lower rate by offering it. It 
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 would instead be that between borrowing (at a relatively high rate) by offering security, and 
not borrowing at all. 
 
To the extent that this analysis holds, we have a way of testing the anti-security 
Hypotheses. Both predict that for troubled firms which might eventually become insolvent, 
there should be a difference in the price of secured and unsecured loans made by banks (i.e. 
creditors which lend both with and without security), secured credit being cheaper. On the 
other hand, if such a relationship is lacking, then we have reason to doubt the validity of the 
anti-security attacks, at least as they stand. We would then have to decide whether the ability 
of security to avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard problems itself creates costs for 
unsecured creditors.  
 
Now for the relevant evidence, which comes from a recent study conducted by Julian 
Franks and Oren Sussman (hereafter, ‘Franks-Sussman’) on behalf of the Working Group on 
Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms.123 Franks-Sussman persuaded 
three large UK clearing banks to grant them access to private records on 542 companies, all 
of which had entered the central ‘rescue units’ of these banks during a certain sampling 
period. The stated purpose of these units is to ‘intervene early in the cycle of a company’s 
decline and provide a greater opportunity for rescue and recovery, without necessarily 
resorting to formal procedures’.124 Firms in the unit are kept under close supervision, and 
might either recover and be sent back to the bank branch, or close their account and take their 
business elsewhere, or come to be regarded as beyond (informal) rescue and consigned to 
another of the bank’s units (the ‘debt recovery unit’) and then perhaps to a formal insolvency 
procedure.125 
 
 An important test conducted by Franks-Sussman on the data obtained from one of the 
banks was aimed at discovering the relationship between interest rate spreads and the 
characteristics of firms as they entered the bank’s rescue unit.126 Two of their findings are 
particularly relevant here. First, the relationship between the ratio of security value to bank 
debt on the one hand and the interest charged on the loan on the other, while being an inverse 
one, was the second least significant (approximately) of all those tested. In other words, how 
much of the bank’s debt was secured was only marginally related to the interest charged on 
the loan, if it was related at all.127 Changes in the interest rate were to be explained 
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 overwhelmingly by factors other than the proportion of bank debt secured. And second, there 
was a ‘highly significant’ direct relationship (perhaps the second strongest of all the factors 
considered) between whether the bank had been given personal guarantees for some part of 
its loan, and the interest it charged on it.128 The greater the likelihood that a guarantee had 
been given, the higher the interest charged. 
 
 This has dramatic implications for the Inefficiency – and equally the Exploitation – 
Hypotheses. For this data at least, it simply is not the case that a debtor can mechanically 
obtain a reduction in its interest bill by offering security. This should be read together with 
Franks-Sussman’s finding that bank debt was ‘almost universally secured’ through a 
combination of fixed and floating charges.129 It does not, then, seem to be a matter of choice 
for the debtor to bargain with its main bank, offering security in return for a lower interest 
rate.130 Security will be extracted as a matter of course from companies likely to end up in the 
bank’s rescue unit (and therefore those most relevant to the two Hypotheses),131 and it may 
not lead to any noticeable reduction in interest charges. For such companies, and consistent 
with the analysis above, the difference between offering security and not offering it does not 
appear to be that between borrowing at lower or higher rates, but more likely that between 
borrowing and not being able to borrow at all.132 As explained above, both the Inefficiency 
and the Exploitation Hypotheses are heavily dependent on the contrary assumption to explain 
why security is asked for and offered. Both must therefore be considered weakened. 
 
 That is not all. Suppose we take the interest charged on the bank loan to be related to 
the bank’s assessment of the borrower’s riskiness.133 The discussion above indicates taking 
security over the latter’s assets is by no means the most discriminating way in which the bank 
responds to this risk (since security is taken anyway from this type of firm, and since the 
extent to which it covers the loan is not strongly associated with the interest rate). In fact, a 
more focused method of dealing with risk seems to be to extract a personal guarantee from 
the firm’s shareholder-managers. Only this explains the ‘highly significant’ relationship 
between the incidence of such guarantees and the rates of interest. The riskier a firm is 
perceived to be, the higher the interest it is charged (of course subject to the limits set by the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems), and the more likely its directors are to be 
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 required to provide personal guarantees.134 The finding that the incidence of directors’ 
guarantees seems remarkably more discriminating than that of security over the firm’s 
assets135 also strongly supports the view that, amongst the firms likely to end up in its rescue 
unit, this is the method the bank uses to separate the riskier from the less risky borrower. 
 
 We should think again about the two Hypotheses we are testing. Both assert that 
security is offered because the debtor (and here this must mean its shareholder-managers) 
wishes to sell off the insolvency share of involuntary, uninformed, or non-adjusting creditors 
(more accurately put, only when this happens do the criticisms implied by the two 
Hypotheses kick in). So (a) the reward they receive in all cases is the reduction in interest 
rates, and, (b) their insolvency costs are unaffected. We can see however that both limbs of 
this type of argument are wrong. As the riskiness of the firm’s activities increases, (a) the 
interest charged to the firm may go up, and (b) the shareholder-managers’ private 
(insolvency-linked) expected costs also increase.136 This evidence shows that regardless of 
the existence of security, operating riskily and aiming at a strategic liquidation becomes 
increasingly unattractive, and any incentive to create tortious harm (in the expectation that it 
could later painlessly be defeated through insolvency) diminishes even further. The 
Exploitation Hypothesis is therefore deprived of any vestigial plausibility. And there remain 
neither incentive nor scope for debtors to sell the insolvency share of non-adjusting creditors 
to a secured creditor in order to pocket the interest payment savings (there being none). So 
the Inefficiency Hypothesis too starts to crumble.  
 
 There is yet another finding of the Franks-Sussman study that – to the extent that it 
can be generalised – should be regarded as fairly decisive against the type of attack on 
security now being discussed. This concerns the relationship between interest rates and the 
ratio of bank debt to total debt. Let us think about what we should expect this to be, if the 
lines of argument we have been considering (derived from the two Hypotheses) led to truth. 
The way the rate reduction assumption is made implies that the borrower has two options. It 
can either operate sensibly, not increase the risk of default faced by its creditors, take 
reasonable precautions to prevent tortious harm, and enjoy a relatively low interest rate on 
the unsecured loan from its main bank. Alternatively, it can engage in risky activities which 
increase the variance of its returns and thus its shareholder value, but also simultaneously its 
chances of facing an insolvent liquidation. It can save money by not taking sufficient 
precautions against potential tort liability. But it can then issue security to its bank and thus 
continue to enjoy the same (or in any case, not significantly higher) rates on the loans made 
to it by the latter. The bank’s pricing decision is very simple. In the first scenario, the bank 
anticipates a low probability of default on its loan, and a small pool of other claims with 
equal priority with its own, and thus charges a low interest rate. In the second, it anticipates a 
higher probability of default, a large number of other claims, but still the same expected 
recovery on its loan because of the priority it now has. So it charges more or less the same 
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 low interest rate. The number of other claimants simply does not matter to it, as long as it has 
priority over all of their claims. This is how the rate reduction assumption operates in the two 
Hypotheses. In view of this, and given the near-universality of security in the Franks-
Sussman data set, we should expect no significant relationship between interest rates and the 
proportion of bank to total debt. 
 
 A different prediction emerges from the two Hypotheses for debtors which were 
more obviously and seriously in trouble before eventually being liquidated insolvent. Here, 
the secured creditor (in practice, the bank) would have a higher expected rate of recovery in 
the debtor’s insolvency if it had available to it a ‘cushion’ of value provided by other 
creditors. This is the bankruptcy value supposedly sold to it through the use of priority by the 
debtor. The latter is rewarded with lower interest rates. The bigger the cushion, the greater 
the protection accorded to the secured creditor. It follows that the bigger the cushion, the 
lower the interest rates charged by it.137 Now the size of this cushion is inversely represented 
by the ratio of bank to total debt. The smaller the proportion of total debt that is owed to the 
bank, the greater is the protection available to it. This is because the debt owed to the 
priority-holding bank is more likely to be repaid (and repaid in full), the greater the 
proportion of the debtor’s estate derived from value provided by the other, subordinate, 
creditors. And on the views being explored, it is precisely because the secured creditor 
expects to be able to appropriate (some of) this value that it would reduce its interest charges. 
On the strength of the two Hypotheses, then, and to the extent that this contingency could be 
reflected in interest rates, we should expect a direct relationship here: the smaller the ratio of 
bank to total debt, the lower the interest charged by the bank. And since this mechanism is 
supposed to explain much (Exploitation) or at least the objectionable bit (Inefficiency) of the 
ubiquity of security, this relationship should be fairly significant. So if the Hypotheses have 
any validity, the relationship between the ratio of bank to total debt and interest rates should 
either be direct and significant (as explained in this paragraph), or simply insignificant (as the 
previous paragraph explains). 
 
 Franks-Sussman’s findings for this variable were indeed ‘highly significant’ (one of 
the strongest of all the relationships tested). They were also exactly the reverse of what the 
anti-security Hypotheses would have us expect! In other words, the greater the proportion of 
total debt that was owed to the bank, and therefore the smaller the cushion of value provided 
by other creditors (and thus available for appropriation to the bank), the lower was the 
interest rate charged on its loan by the bank.138 To the extent that the implications of these 
findings can be generalised, then, secured creditors very clearly do not display predatory 
intentions towards value contributed by other creditors, at least in the pricing of their loans. 
Nor, it therefore follows, do they create an incentive for the debtor to ‘sweep in’ significant 
amounts of this value in order to sell it to the secured creditor in return for lower interest 
rates. In fact, as we have just seen, secured creditors seem positively to discourage debtors 
from borrowing too much from other creditors by unambiguously charging them higher 
interest rates, the greater the proportional value derived from other creditors. This surely 
leaves little room for doubt. It is submitted this – in addition to all the other evidence 
discussed in this paper – proves that arguments meant to explain the prevalence of secured 
credit, but based on debtor-secured creditor coalitions extracting ‘subsidies’ from an 
assortment of involuntary, uninformed, ‘ill-equipped’, and non-adjusting creditors, all just do 
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 not hold water.139 Therefore, very simply, they cannot be used to base suggestions for 
‘improvements’ to the institution of secured credit.140 
 
5. Informal ‘rescues’, trade creditors and the bank’s share 
 
In the arguments in the previous Section, considerable reliance has been placed on certain of 
the findings of the recent Franks-Sussman study. As argued above, the study goes a long way 
to disproving crucial assumptions underlying the most important existing attacks on the 
priority of secured credit, as well as some of the predictions that can be derived from them. 
But the same study also highlights an aspect of the way banks operate in this jurisdiction that 
might be thought to provide new ammunition to critics of security. That is what this Section 
considers. 
 
As already noted, Franks-Sussman discovered an extensive and elaborate process of 
‘intensive care’ operated by all three of the banks they studied for firms that were taken to be 
heading for trouble. Firms were consigned to these ‘central rescue units’ based on the bank’s 
own criteria, and subject to considerable discretion in credit officers at individual branches. 
They remained there for an average of seven and a half months.141 There could be one of 
three outcomes of this process. The firm might be ‘turned around’ (rescued) and returned to 
its bank branch. Or it could be sent to a ‘debt recovery unit’ for the initiation of a formal 
insolvency procedure. Or finally, it could repay all its loans to the bank, terminate the 
banking relationship, and presumably re-bank elsewhere.  
 
 The discovery which interests us now is that, while in the ‘rescue unit’ and subject to 
close supervision by specialised bank officials, the troubled companies paid off, on average, 
between 30-40% of their bank debt. At the same time, the debt owed to trade creditors 
increased by between 10-30%.142 This was the case overall, both for firms which were 
eventually rescued and ‘returned to branch’, and those which were sent to the ‘debt recovery 
unit’ for formal insolvency proceedings. The picture was quite similar if the latter were 
considered in isolation. For one of the banks, Franks-Sussman found that ‘the bank never 
extends further loans to a company that is placed eventually in bankruptcy… although the 
trade creditors do so quite often.’143 On average for this bank, bank credit shrank by almost 
14% and trade credit grew by over 11% while the company was in the ‘rescue unit’. Given 
that in the insolvency proceedings that followed for these companies, the bank would have 
priority over trade creditors, this amounted to ‘almost a direct transfer from the trade 
creditors to the bank.’ This despite the fact that, as the authors noted, ‘trade creditors are 
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 typically small, undiversified, and highly exposed to the risk of default. Unlike the bank, they 
have no comparative advantage in bearing these risks.’144 
 
 It would not be surprising if some critics of security seized upon these results as 
proof, at last, for one or other of the anti-security Hypotheses. Surely security is being used, 
very simply, to siphon away value from trade creditors? The temptation to use these figures 
to paint -- with a broad brush -- a picture of exploitation on part of secured creditors might 
well be strong. It is submitted this temptation is best resisted if the aim is instead to acquire 
an accurate picture of these figures. The first point to note is the obvious one that the 
movement of funds from trade creditors to the company in the rescue unit, and from it to the 
bank, as depicted in the previous paragraph, is based on averages across the client firms of 
this particular bank. This is significant here because these averages hide what in fact are the 
‘great variations in the record of debt repayments’ to trade creditors and the bank during the 
time the firm was under bank supervision. This is obvious, for example, from a comparison 
of firms arranged with reference to the amount of debt outstanding at the time of entry into 
the ‘rescue unit’. For companies in the bottom quartile, 58.7% of bank debt was indeed 
repaid on average. However, this figure decreases to 18.2% for those in the next quartile up. 
For companies in the top quartile, bank debt actually increased by 29.1% while the firms 
were under close scrutiny by bank officials.145 So the first conclusion to be drawn is that 
security is not accurately regarded as merely a mechanism for appropriating value provided 
to the troubled firm by trade creditors. In fact, as noted, there are very significant differences 
in bank strategy in dealing with firms of different sizes.146 For larger firms, the (security-
holding) bank actually injects additional value into the firm, which amounts on average to a 
third of what it was originally owed. 
 
 Next, we should note that there is a fairly straight-forward correlation between the 
repayment of the troubled firm’s bank debt, and the sale of assets by the firm itself. Almost 
half the firms in the ‘rescue unit’ reported ‘significant asset sales in the rescue process’. In 
interpreting this data, it is important to keep in mind both the priority-based nature of 
security, and the fact that the ‘absolute priority rule’ (which requires senior creditors to be 
paid off before junior claimants get anything) is quite firmly entrenched in this jurisdiction. 
Given these factors, the finding that the firms which sold off assets usually applied most of 
the proceeds to pay off their bank debt should come as no surprise.147 If any assets become 
available during the rescue process, the bank as senior claimant obviously has the first right 
to them. The important thing to note here is that this is merely a manifestation of the nature 
of security. It is not, by itself, evidence that security is exploitative. Critics of the priority of 
secured lending have to say something more than that secured creditors have priority! The 
data so far mentioned supports only the latter proposition. It also shows once again that the 
relationship between value provided by trade creditors and that withdrawn by the security 
holder is not as clear-cut as the average figures mentioned above misleadingly suggest. Much 
of the repayment of bank debt (though certainly not all) can be attributed to the sale of assets, 
rather than to the appropriation of value injected by trade creditors. 
 
 The obvious question then is: why the apparent beneficence towards larger distressed 
companies, and in turn towards their trade creditors, as noted above? Further analysis carried 
out by Franks-Sussman provides an interesting insight. A ‘striking explanation’ for the 
differences in repayment of bank debt is ‘the incidence of managerial turnover’. The data 
shows that firms which owed the bank more (and were thus presumably larger) were more 
likely to replace an important member of the managerial team. For such firms, the bank 
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 contracted its debt by a mere 1.2%. Smaller firms changed their management much more 
rarely, and the bank contracted its debt to them to a far greater degree, at 28.3%.148 This is 
consistent with the point made in Section 2 of this paper, that managers of smaller firms, who 
also own most of the equity in it, would have huge undiversified pecuniary, and 
undiversifiable non-pecuniary, investments in the firm. It simply does not make sense for 
them to let go of control of the firm, since the costs to them of doing so are great. They prefer 
to remain at the helm even when that increases the probability their firm would be unable to 
survive a particular crisis. This should be read together with the finding that the higher the 
probability that a manager would be replaced, very significantly greater is the chance that the 
firm would be successfully rescued, of course to the benefit of all including trade creditors.149  
 
 All this shows that any conclusion that the bank simply uses its security to 
appropriate value from trade creditors would be crude and inaccurate. In reality, the position 
seems to be that the bank employs the leverage provided to it by security ‘to encourage (or 
force) distressed firms to undergo restructuring, that includes downsizing and managerial 
replacement. [Both these factors appear] to be significantly [and inversely] related to the size 
of debt repayments demanded by bank’. They are also significantly (and positively) related to 
the probability of a successful rescue.150 All the concerned parties, including trade creditors, 
are much better off if their debtor recovers than if it is liquidated.151 An overwhelming 
proportion of attempted rescues (around 75%) succeed without formal insolvency 
proceedings.152 All this happens in the bank’s ‘rescue unit’ under close supervision by its 
officials, and as noted, is made possible by the leverage provided to the bank through its 
priority position. The bank’s officials of course monitor the firm in the unit and gather data 
about it, then use it to encourage the firm (in general, successfully) towards a turn-around. 
They use this same data, it seems, to ensure the debt owed to the bank is paid off first when 
the firm is not likely to recover, even while the less-informed trade creditors continue to 
pump value into the sinking firm. 
 
 It appears, then, that one of the costs of the elaborate monitoring done by the banks 
of the distressed firm is the chance that if the firm does not recover, the bank would be paid 
even at the expense of the firm’s trade creditors. But it should be emphasised this by itself is 
not an argument against either the efficiency or indeed the fairness of the priority of security, 
since no one, to this author’s knowledge, has suggested that outside monitoring of distressed 
firms does not have costs. The point is that this same monitoring also seems to bring the great 
benefit to all, including trade creditors, of a very significant chance of successful rescue of 
the debtor. It follows that to make an argument against security, one would have to conclude 
either (or both) of two things. First, one would have to show that the removal or reduction of 
the priority of secured lending would not impede the secured creditor’s ability to monitor and 
influence the debtor. Alternatively, it would have to be demonstrated that the benefit of an 
increased chance of successful rescue associated with this monitoring is outweighed 
nevertheless by whatever harm results from it in case of that minority of firms for which this 
monitoring does not lead to rescue.153 Till such an argument is made (and made successfully), 
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 it is submitted the Franks-Sussman study cannot be used in support of either of the anti-
security Hypotheses. This suggestion is reinforced by the important fact that, as discussed 
above, the study shows secured creditors (in particular, the very bank whose strategy is 
discussed in this Section) seem to price their debt in a way which very clearly belies the 
assumptions and predictions of them both. 
 
 But do we have to leave this debate in this rather inconclusive state? Must we wait 
till data is available to decide the questions just posed, before deciding whether the priority 
of secured credit is desirable, all things considered? Fortunately, we can do somewhat better. 
 
6. Beginning the affirmative case for the priority of secured lending 
 
The burden of the argument so far has mostly been to show what security does not do. It has 
been argued it does not facilitate the exploitation of involuntary or ‘uninformed’ creditors. 
Nor does it create inefficiency through its ability to transfer insolvency value from ‘non-
adjusting’ to secured creditors and debtors. It would be natural at this point to ask what its 
role really is. That debate seems interminable, as mentioned above. The issue will not of 
course be settled here. However, this Section takes the argument further, utilising evidence 
from this jurisdiction to suggest the priority of secured credit, by reducing the probability of 
the debtor’s insolvency in the first place, is likely in general to be universally value-
enhancing. The argument, in outline, is the following. Companies borrow on a secured basis 
in two situations. There are, first, those which could borrow without offering security. These 
companies have strong incentives not to offer security. They will pledge collateral only when 
this significantly reduces their risk of insolvency. Other companies are faced with the choice 
between either offering security, or not being able to borrow at all. This being the case, 
security is almost always offered for ‘new money’. For such companies, this new money 
means the difference between solvency and insolvency. All creditors, including preferential, 
trade, and any ‘involuntary’ creditors, are far better off if their company survives, than if it is 
liquidated insolvent. It follows that secured credit, by improving the probability of the 
debtor’s survival, is value-enhancing from their perspective in both situations.154 
 
In the first situation, then, we should begin by noting that companies in a position to 
borrow on an unsecured basis have very strong incentives not to borrow secured. Evidence 
(from this jurisdiction and the US) that the strongest companies very rarely (if ever) borrow 
on a secured basis has already been mentioned above.155 As noted there, this fact is 
universally acknowledged, including by the leading critics of security. Nor is this some 
unexplained empirical anomaly. We have strong theoretical reasons for supposing firms 
would rather borrow unsecured than secured. We can understand these by first asking why 
firms issue secured debt. The only reason routinely mentioned is that it would allow them to 
benefit from reduced interest rates. But on this basis, the healthiest firms have little incentive 
to issue secured debt. This is because the reduction in interest rates that security supposedly 
                                                                                                                                       
captured by the ‘choice position’ of the Authentic Consent Model, where a party is asked to make 
decisions about appropriate rules after being deprived of the knowledge, not only of whether it would 
be a trade creditor of a firm which is successfully rescued or of one which is liquidated, but even 
whether it will turn out to be a trade- or employee- or bank creditor in the first place, etc.; see Mokal, 
above n 2. 
154
 This argument is adapted from Schwarcz’s compelling analysis in the US context; see above n 10. 
155
 In the case of such companies, security would be offered only for non-recourse loans, where the 
lender’s rights of recovery are limited to the asset or project being financed. It is obvious that here, the 
overall credit-worthiness of the borrower matters much less than the riskiness of the project itself. So 
when applied in this context, the arguments which follow should be interpreted as referring to the 
viability of the particular project being funded thus, not to the overall viability of the firm. 
 brings is said to be overwhelmingly dependent on the probability of default on the loan.156 
Now, the healthier the firm, the less likely it is to default. It follows that the healthier the 
firm, the less appreciable will be the interest rate difference for it to borrow on a secured 
basis, and the smaller the incentive for it to do so.157 Healthy firms would only borrow 
secured (rather than unsecured) in order to benefit from such differences if the benefit from 
doing so still outweighed the costs. 
 
We should remember, though, that there are costs associated with secured debt, and 
that these can be substantial. Three of the most important categories of such costs are 
identified here. First, as emphasised above, the creditor with security has a far greater 
influence on debtor behaviour than the same creditor without, and it can demand more 
scrupulous compliance with loan covenants. The debtor’s managers lose their freedom of 
action by issuing security, and with it, their ability to add to the variance of the firm’s returns 
and thus to its shareholder value. Now there is of course a partial asymmetry in the way this 
loss is viewed by the debtor’s shareholder-managers, and by all others interested in the 
debtor’s undertaking. It has been noted time and again that controlling these agency costs is 
value-enhancing for the latter, because lowering the variance of the firm’s returns also lowers 
the chances that it will be rendered insolvent. However, the shareholder-mangers, who would 
capture the upside from the additional variance, would consider the security-holder’s ability 
to prevent them doing so as a reason against granting security.  
 
 Second, firms would prefer to keep unpledged collateral at their disposal till they 
really are in financial distress. The reasons for this have also been touched upon above. 
Distressed firms find it harder to persuade creditors to lend, since the latter perceive the high 
risk of default. Given that degree of risk, even critics of security accept that ‘the interest rates 
necessary to compensate [lenders on an unsecured loan would be] far above customary and 
legal levels [more accurately, as already explained, above levels where the adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems associated with high rates become acute]. Creditors [would not 
then] charge higher rates; they [would simply] refuse to lend.’158 It follows that ‘existing 
firms with unpledged security are more likely to have access to external finance to help them 
trade through difficulties’ by only then offering their assets as collateral.159 In addition, firms 
with growth possibilities would wish to keep free collateral in order to avoid the 
‘underinvestment’ problem. They might find it difficult at a later date to finance a profitable 
project using outside funds, given that if insolvency then occurs, the returns from the new 
venture might go in part or fully to pay off pre-existing creditors. Being asked to subsidise 
these creditors in this way puts off potential new lenders from providing funds. The ability to 
attract new funding by offering later creditors a higher priority is one way of overcoming this 
problem.160 In both the situations just mentioned, ‘using up’ collateral prematurely, when it 
was still possible to borrow unsecured, merely to enjoy any tiny (more likely, non-existent) 
interest rate benefits would make little sense, and certainly would not be a rational strategy. 
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  Finally, and following from the observations above that strong companies do not 
often borrow on a secured basis and that any security-based interest rate differences are only 
going to be important for risky firms, encumbering most of one’s assets could be a signal that 
creditors do not consider this debtor a safe enough risk to lend to it unsecured.161 We have 
already considered evidence above that in this jurisdiction, when creditors’ perception of the 
firm’s riskiness increases, the interest rate charged on loans to it goes up, and the firm’s 
shareholder-managers are often asked to provide personal guarantees. Other counter-parties 
might also seek to tighten up their terms, insisting for example on trading on a cash-on-
delivery basis. Once again, then, pledging the firm’s assets is unlikely to be taken lightly by 
its managers, since it brings disadvantages both for them and their firm.  
 
For all these reasons, firms able to borrow unsecured will only offer security where 
there is a significant ex ante risk of managerial misbehaviour, and therefore a significant risk 
of insolvency. Only then would the existence of security lower the risk of insolvent 
liquidation sufficiently to cause the lender to offer a rate reduction on a secured loan large 
enough to outweigh these costs. The most obvious example of the sort of firm in this position 
would be one with large growth potential, whose managers might be perceived to have a 
greater incentive, once the loan has been made, to engage in negative net present value 
projects. Managers could use security as a bond to obtain cheaper finance.162 
 
 Moving on to the second situation where security will be deployed, there is 
substantial evidence that for many of the companies borrowing secured, the choice is one 
between doing so and not being able to borrow at all, not that between borrowing unsecured 
on higher rates and secured on lower ones. The Bank of England has noted that ‘Ready 
access to finance when needed is often a more compelling consideration for small firms than 
its actual cost’, and that ‘the availability of debt finance to small firms is affected by the size 
and value of those assets which can be taken as collateral’.163 A survey of its members by the 
Institute of Directors found that more than half of those ‘whose plea for finance had been 
dismissed by their bank attributed the bank’s decision to their lack of collateral’.164 And we 
have already noted above that the Franks-Sussman study found that firms which eventually 
ended up in the banks’ ‘rescue units’ had almost universally borrowed on a secured basis. In 
view of the evidence discussed above, any suggestion these firms could have bargained with 
their bank to borrow unsecured by offering a higher interest rate would be simply incredible. 
 
 This analysis leads us to postulate that there will come a time when some companies 
wishing to gain credit will either have to offer their assets as collateral, or do without credit 
altogether. Not all firms will then offer security; some would prefer to find other ways of 
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 raising money (e.g. through equity injections), or would go without additional funds at that 
point.165 So for firms which do end up borrowing on a secured basis, the choice they would 
have faced would likely have been even starker. It would have been one between offering 
security or going into insolvent liquidation. The reason is easy to understand. Firms would 
only borrow on a secured basis when they could not borrow unsecured, and the value to them 
of new funding exceeded the costs identified above. This is only likely to be the case when 
they face a serious threat to their continued survival. Only then would the opportunity cost of 
having unpledged assets (held precisely so as to be available in a crisis), any reputational 
costs of offering security, the costs of surrendering some freedom of action to a creditor, etc. 
are likely to be outweighed by the expected costs of impending insolvency. We can speculate 
about the type of company likely to find itself in this situation. Most obviously, this would be 
the case for companies on the brink of or already in financial distress. It is also likely to be 
the case with some start-ups which have no established track record and therefore a lesser 
chance of persuading a bank of the competence of its management and (less importantly) the 
viability of its business plans.166 Both types of firm are likely to be faced with a credit crunch 
and a looming liquidity crisis. And there is support for the proposition that the lack of 
liquidity is a leading cause of insolvency.167 Loss of long term finance, lack of working 
capital and a poor cash flow have been consistently identified as among the main factors in 
company failure in successive Surveys by the Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals (formerly, SPI).168 And the Bank of England has noted the more direct finding 
that ‘the availability of collateral does not impact on the birth of new firms, but on [their] 
survival rates’.169 
 
 So firms unable to borrow without pledging collateral are likely to borrow secured 
only when their survival depends on being able to find fresh funding. This should be read 
together with evidence from the US that the availability of fresh funding for distressed firms 
raises both the expected recovery rates for unsecured creditors, and the chances of the firm 
itself being rescued successfully.170 We can now see why the availability of secured funding 
is actually value-enhancing for all of the firm’s creditors. All creditors are much better off if 
their debtor either (a) lowers the probability of ending up insolvent, or even more strongly, 
(b) recovers from financial distress. This is dramatically brought out by considering the 
following calculation.171 Let U = the expected value of unsecured claims, p = the probability 
that the debtor would be liquidated insolvent, and F = the actual, full value of unsecured 
claims. Suppose also that if the debtor is liquidated without secured credit ever being issued, 
unsecured creditors would get a (very generous) 80 pence on the pound.172 If the debtor 
becomes insolvent after having issued secured credit, unsecured claimants would 
(pessimistically) get nothing.173 In either case, if the debtor survives, unsecured creditors are 
paid back in full. Finally and in line with the analysis above, assume that if secured credit is 
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 not available when it is most likely to be used (i.e. when the debtor suffers a high risk of 
ending up insolvent), the probability of the debtor being liquidated insolvent is (a relatively 
low) 60%. If secured credit is then issued, it falls moderately to 40%.174 The expected value 
of unsecured claims is then given by the equation: 
 
 Expected value of unsecured claims = probability of insolvent liquidation multiplied 
by the return on unsecured claims in debtor’s insolvency + probability of rescue 
multiplied by the return on unsecured claims if debtor is rescued. 
 
 If no secured debt is issued, the equation can be solved as follows: 
 
 U = p (0.8 x F) + (1-p) F 
 
 = 0.6 (0.8 x F) + (0.4 x F) 
 
 = 0.52 x F 
 
 On the other hand, if secured debt is issued, the outcome is: 
 
 U = p (0) + (1-p) F 
 
 = (0.4 x 0) + 0.6 x F 
 
 = 0.6 x F 
 
 So even on these very conservative figures which assume a relatively low probability 
of insolvent liquidation if the high-risk firm does not borrow on a secured basis, a very 
moderate decrease in this probability if secured credit is issued, and fairly extreme figures for 
the return on unsecured claims, the conclusion is still that all unsecured creditors are better 
off because some creditors are induced to lend by being offered priority, when they would not 
lend if priority could not be offered to them. So secured credit enhances the expected value of 
all claims (preferential, trade, involuntary, ‘uninformed’, ‘non-adjusting’, etc.) by reducing 
the risk of the debtor’s insolvency. 
 
 It should also be pointed out that this argument does not depend at all on many of the 
‘traditional’ justifications of security, e.g., that it is fair from the point of view of unsecured 
creditors because they would have notice of its existence, or that the law should not restrict 
the property rights of debtors in their assets or the freedom of contract of debtors and 
potential secured creditors.175 Nothing in this argument turns on taking any position on these 
issues. 
 
 There is however one other possibility which has not yet been considered. Suppose 
the debtor has no secured debt, and gets into difficulties. Its main bank demands security, not 
by offering it more credit (or sufficient credit to bring about an improvement in the debtor’s 
chances of survival we stipulate to be ‘appropriate’), but by threatening to send it into 
liquidation straightaway if security is not given for debt already outstanding. It would be very 
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 surprising if this never happens in the real world today.176 This is the point where the analysis 
in this Section ties into the suggestions made at the end of the previous one. It is in the 
situation now being considered that the only benefit (if any) to the debtor’s unsecured 
creditors comes from the increased ability of the bank to monitor and influence the debtor, 
thereby improving the latter’s chances of recovery. So the two questions given at the end of 
the last Section are relevant only to that sub-set of situations where security is given for no 
(or insufficient) new value. 
 
 However, we should note the following point. Even if it were concluded, in this 
situation, that the expected costs to unsecured creditors of being deferred to secured creditors 
in their debtor’s insolvency are greater than the expected benefits of the improved chances of 
avoiding insolvency flowing from the increased control of debtor behaviour alone (as 
explained in the previous Section), this still would not by itself be an argument for restricting 
the priority of secured lending. We would then have reason to suppose priority was being 
demanded by one creditor here simply to improve its own position at the expense of others, in 
other words, to secure a preference for itself. But then, this ought to be dealt with just like 
any other attempt to engineer such a preference. So we would have an argument for 
strengthening the legal provisions against voidable preferences (and perhaps those against 
transactions at an undervalue), so as to bar the offering of security except for appropriate new 
value. In effect, there would then be a good reason for reconsidering -- and perhaps reversing 
-- either or both parts of the decision in Re MC Bacon Ltd. (No. 1).177 An obvious reform 
would be to extend in an appropriate way the effect of section 245 of the Insolvency Act, 
which invalidates floating charges granted for ‘past value’, to cover fixed charges as well. It 
seems to this author that any more general tampering with the priority of secured credit needs 
stronger justification than is currently available. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the main attacks on the institution of secured credit, and in 
particular, on the priority of secured lending. It identified the main parties that are alleged to 
be harmed by the existence of that priority. The supposed exploitation of involuntary 
(especially tort) creditors was the obvious starting point. It was argued that the possibility of 
such exploitation is very remote. For large firms which have the ability to acquire significant 
involuntary credit (for example by inflicting tortious harm), there is evidence that little or no 
secured debt is issued, and such involuntary creditors are paid off to a significant degree. For 
smaller firms which do issue security, the alleged benefit of reduction in interest rates 
obtained by doing so is likely to be greatly outweighed by the costs of liquidation to their 
shareholder-managers. A ‘representative’ numerical example was discussed in order to bring 
out the implausibility of the Exploitation Hypothesis. Empirical data was also examined to 
test the predictions of the Hypothesis, each one of which it seems to contradict. 
 
 Attention was also given to the claim that security creates a subsidy extracted by 
coalitions of debtors and secured creditors from ‘uninformed’ or ‘ill-equipped’ or 
‘unsophisticated’ creditors who systematically underestimate the risk associated with their 
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 loans and therefore under-price them. Such arguments seem to pay insufficient attention to 
the purging effects of the market, which encourage creditors either to learn how to price 
loans properly, or be driven out of business. The startling implications of the suggestion that 
naturally ‘unsophisticated’ creditors be ‘protected’ from the effects of the priority of secured 
credit were also brought out and examined. 
 
 The claims that the existence of ‘non-adjusting’ creditors leads to several types of 
inefficiency, mainly to do with the monitoring implications of substituting the protection it 
offers in place of the extraction and enforcement of non-security covenants, were also 
investigated. It was suggested that empirical evidence from this jurisdiction casts doubt both 
on the assumptions on which these arguments (and the others noted above) are based, and on 
the predictions that can be extracted from them. Most notably, the assumptions that it is up to 
the debtor to offer security, and that if it does, the interest rate it is charged would go down 
while the insolvency costs of its shareholder-managers remain unaffected, all are found to be 
false. The basic prediction of the anti-security Hypotheses that there would either be no 
significant relationship, or a direct one, between the proportion of the total estate derived 
from value provided by the secured creditor and the interest rate it charges, is also strongly 
belied by the evidence available. In this context, the informal ‘intensive care’ provided by 
banks (generally as secured creditors) to distressed firms was also examined.  
 
 In view of all these arguments and data, we can conclude, as did Schwartz in the US, 
that in this jurisdiction too, ‘the case for restricting the secured debt priority in bankruptcy 
has yet to be made.’178 The argument in this paper concluded with a demonstration that the 
priority of secured credit is likely to be value-enhancing for all unsecured creditors. To the 
extent that this last point holds, unsecured creditors have every reason to wish not to be 
‘saved’ from secured ones! 
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